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I. Introduction 
 
The East Asian countries  achieved extraordinarily fast 
economic growth during the last four decades.  Indeed, it 
would be no exaggeration to say that they represented the 
most successful case of rapid industrialisation and 
sustained economic growth in the history of mankind.  An 
economy like South Korea’s was unequivocally industrially 
backward in the mid-1950s. Its per capita industrial 
output was at the time US$ 8  compared with US$ 7  for 
India and US$ 60 for Mexico.  By mid 1990, the country  
was the fifth largest car producer in the world, the 
largest producer of DRAM microchips, and the home of the 
world’s most efficient steel industry.  Its per capita 
income  had increased from x dollars to nearly US$ 10,000 
over a thirty-five year time span.   
 
The Korean story of fast industrialisation and 
technological catch up is by no means unique.  The other 
three countries in the Gang of Four - Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore also achieved similar economic success.  
More recently, these four countries were followed by 
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia who also recorded 
sustained and rapid growth of per capita income.  
Significantly, these “miracle” countries not only 
expanded at a fast rate but they also did so without any 
worsening of income distribution.  Their record of 
poverty reduction has been truly remarkable.  As 
Professor Joseph Stiglitz, the World Bank’s Chief 
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Economist, notes: “In 1975, six out of 10 Asians lived on 
less than $1 a day.  In Indonesia, the absolute poverty 
rate was even higher.  Today, two out of 10 East Asians 
are living in absolute poverty.  Korea, Thailand and 
Malaysia have eliminated poverty and Indonesia is within 
striking distance of that goal.  The USA and other 
western countries, which have also seen solid growth over 
the last 20 years but with little reduction in poverty 
rates, could well learn from the East Asian experience 
(Stiglitz, 1998).” 
 
These “miracle” economies, with an acknowledged record of 
economic success, have suddenly and simultaneously 
suffered an extraordinary reversal which justifies the 
term economic meltdown.  Until the eve of the crisis 
(which can be dated July 2, 1997 when the Thai 
authorities floated the baht), the economic management of 
Indonesia (the worst hit economy) was being praised by 
the IMF and the World Bank.  It would also be true to say 
that no one had predicted this extraordinary turn of 
events for what had emerged as the most dynamic region of 
the world economy.
1
  Between 1980 and 1995, the developing 
East Asian economies were growing at a rate nearly three 
times that of the world economy.   
 
As the crisis has developed a number of theories have 
been put forward to explain it.  One of the most 
influential analyses ascribes the crisis to the 
underlying model of guided capitalism which most of these 
countries had been following in one form or another.  The 
widely respected Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Mr. 
                                                     
1
   It could be argued that there were some worries about 
Thailand’s property market bubble and the weakness of its 
financial system before the crisis.  This, however, was not so 
in relation to other countries.  Even in the case of Thailand 
the government was carrying out reforms to improve the bank 
system.  
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Alan Greenspan, advanced this thesis in the following 
terms:  
 
[In the last decade or so, the world has 
observed] a consensus towards, for want of a 
better term, the Western form of free-market 
capitalism as the model which should  govern how 
each individual country should run its 
economy...We saw the breakdown of the Berlin wall 
in 1989 and the massive shift away from central 
planning  towards free market capitalist types of 
structures.  Concurrent to that was the really 
quite dramatic , very strong growth in what 
appeared to be a competing capitalist-type system 
in Asia.  And as a consequence of that, you had 
developments of types of structures which I 
believe at the end of the day were faulty, but 
you could not demonstrate that so long as growth 
was going at 10 percent a year.
2
      
 
The same thesis is more graphically put by Richard Hornik 
in the popular Time magazine as follows: 
 
…For it is the top-down nature of the Asian model 
itself that is the real cause of the crisis.  
This model bred complacency, cronyism and 
corruption.  Isolated from public opinion, just 
as they insulated bankers and businessmen from 
market forces, the technocrats ignored the 
deafening clamour of alarm bells that market 
forces have been ringing for years…The financial 
crisis facing Asia today is merely a symptom of a 
much deeper problem.  The social and political 
assumptions on which the Asian model was founded 
are terribly outdated.  The global economy is far 
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too complex and fast paced for any bureaucrats to 
control.  The only miracle in Asia is that this 
approach worked as long as it did. 
 
More significantly, these views are central to the IMF’s 
analysis of the crisis and their policy programme.  As 
conditionality for its multi-billion dollar bailout 
packages which the fund has arranged, these countries are 
being asked to bring about fundamental reforms in their 
economic systems.  They are asked to change, among many 
other things, their systems of corporate governance, 
labour laws, and competition laws so as to rid these 
economies of “crony capitalism” and “non-transparency” 
and myriad market rigidities such as life-time employment 
in South Korea.   
 
The present paper critically examines this thesis.  It 
will first outline the main characteristics of the Asian 
model of capitalism.  It will be argued here that this 
thesis is not only incorrect, but that the policy 
recommendations based on it are likely to prolong the 
crisis rather than to alleviate it whilst also 
undermining the prospects for long-term growth.  The 
paper, therefore, recommends a fundamental change in the 
IMF’s analytical and policy approach to the crisis. 
 
 
II. The Asian Model 
 
What are the main characteristics of the East Asian 
model?  What is the causal connection between them and 
the crisis? 
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  Quoted in the International Herald Tribune, 13 February 1998.  
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The Asian model is perhaps best epitomised by the 
experience of Japan during its high growth phase from 
1950 to 1973.  During that period the Japanese economy 
achieved unprecedented structural transformation and 
economic growth.  Between 1953 and 1973, manufacturing 
production expanded at a rate of 13% per annum while GDP 
expanded by nearly 10% per annum.  Although it started 
from a low level, Japan’s share of world exports of 
manufactures increased by a huge ten percentage points 
during this period. 
 
Economic organisation of the country during this high 
growth phase involved heavy state intervention in all 
spheres of the economy (the intervention was much reduced 
and the Japanese economy became much more open following 
its accession to OECD membership around 1970).  There was 
a close relationship between government and business and 
between them and the financial system.  Furthermore, the 
relationship between the financial system and the 
corporation was of a rather different kind than that 
found in the US and the UK.  
 
Professors Caves of Harvard University and Professor 
Uekusa of Tokyo University in their classic study  
Industrial Organisation in Japan correctly portrayed the 
relationship between government and business in Japan as 
follows: 
 
Each sector of the Japanese economy has a 
cliental relation to a ministry or agency of the 
government.  The ministry, in addition to its 
various statutory means of dealing with the 
economic sector, holds a general implied 
administrative responsibility and authority that 
goes well beyond what is customary in the United 
States and other Western countries.  While the 
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Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) plays the most prominent role, its 
operations are not distinctive. “The industrial 
bureaus of MITI proliferate sectoral targets and 
plans; they confer, they tinker, they exhort.  
This is the economics by admonition to a degree 
inconceivable in Washington or London.  Business 
makes few major decisions without consulting the 
appropriate governmental authority; the same is 
true in reverse.” (Caves and Uekusa, 1976, p.149) 
       
More specifically, following Singh (1997, 1998b, 1998c), 
Amsden and Singh (1994), Amsden (1989), and Evans (1987), 
some of the more important characteristics of the 
Japanese model - which were subsequently emulated to a 
greater or lesser degree by other Asian countries - can 
be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Although there was a close relationship between 
government and business and extensive consultation 
through the so-called “deliberation councils”, an 
important characteristic which distinguished East 
Asian from other dirigiste states was that the 
government provided assistance to the corporations 
only in return for adherence to strict performance 
standards. 
 
2. Interventions were carried out through a system of 
administrative guidance rather than through formal 
legislation.  In order for this system not to be 
subject to private rent-seeking or social abuse, it 
required a certain autonomy for the permanent civil 
service which guided the economy. Such relative 
autonomy prevailed in East Asian states to a far 
greater degree than in Brazil, Mexico or India. 
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3. The relationship between the corporation and the 
financial system in countries like Japan and Korea 
has also been very different from that of the US 
and the UK.  The former countries have followed, 
for example, the so-called main bank system which 
involves long-term relationships between the 
corporations and the main banks.  This enables 
Japanese or Korean managers to take a long-term 
view in their investment decisions.  The managers 
are not constrained by the threat of hostile take-
overs on stock markets as is the case in the Anglo-
Saxon countries. (Aoki and Patrick, 1992; Odagiri, 
1994) 
 
4. There are differences in the internal organisation 
of East Asian corporations compared with those of 
the US and the UK.  The former involve a co-
operative relationship between management and 
labour, epitomised by the system of lifetime 
employment in the successful large corporations.  
This implies considerable imperfections in the 
labour market.  (Dore, 1986; Aoki,  1990) 
  
5.   As for the competition in product markets, such 
competition is not regarded by the East Asian 
authorities as an unalloyed good.  Unlike in 
countries like the US, economic philosophy in the 
East Asian countries does not accept the dictum 
that “the more competition the better.”  The 
governments in these countries have taken the view 
that, from the perspective of promoting investment 
and technical change, the optimal degree of 
competition is not perfect or maximum competition.  
The governments have therefore purposefully managed 
and guided competition: it has been encouraged but 
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also restricted in a number of ways (Amsden and 
Singh, 1994).  
 
6.   Following this basic economic philosophy outlined 
above, the East Asian governments have sought not 
“close” but what might be called “strategic” 
integration with the world economy, i.e. they have 
integrated up to the point where it has been useful 
for them to do so.  Thus, during their high-growth, 
developmental phases, Japan (between 1950-1973) and 
Korea (1970s and 1980s) integrated with the world 
economy in relation to exports but not imports; 
with respect to science and technology but not 
finance and multinational investment (Chakravarty 
and Singh, 1988). 
 
It will be appreciated that the characteristics of the 
Asian model outlined above are of an ideal type.  At one 
level, each country has specificities which are 
important.  More generally, the South East Asian 
economies such as Malaysia and Indonesia were much more 
open in terms of FDI and other capital inflows than South 
Korea.  The degree and effectiveness of state 
intervention also varied between  countries with Korea 
being at the top end and perhaps Thailand at the bottom 
end.  Nevertheless, there is a pronounced family 
resemblance in the way these countries do business and 
structure their institutions that sets them apart from 
the US and the UK as well as other developing regions. 
 
 
III.  The Crisis and the Asian Model 
  
Table 1 indicates the contours of the financial crisis.  
It shows the collapse of the stock markets and the 
currency markets in the crisis-affected countries.  From 
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July 1, 1997 to February 18, 1998, the stock market in 
the worst hit country, Indonesia, fell by over 80% and 
the exchange rate against the US$ by almost 75%.  The 
currency and stock markets had evidently interacted with 
each other in a negative feedback loop in response to 
external shocks. 
 
Those who attribute the crisis fundamentally to the 
underlying model of capitalism in the Asian economies 
have a difficulty in linking the two phenomena.  For the 
important question is, if the model was deficient, why 
was it so extraordinarily successful for so long?  What 
caused the sudden collapse?  To be satisfactory, a theory 
of the crisis must be able to account for both of these 
aspects. 
 
Krugman had argued in an influential paper (1994) that 
the success of the these economies was unlikely to be 
sustainable over a long period.  Using the growth 
accounting framework, he cited evidence from Alwyn Young 
and others to indicate that the Asian economic miracle 
was based on greater use of inputs rather than a more 
productive use of them.  Since there were obvious limits 
to the growth of inputs of labour and capital, he thought 
that these economies would inevitably slow down.  This 
analysis, however, was by no means universally accepted.  
Critics took issue with both the evidence and its 
interpretation.  They also pointed to the limitations of 
the growth accounting framework which made their 
conclusions highly dependent on a very narrow 
methodology.  In any case, even if Krugman’s thesis was 
correct, this cannot explain the suddenness of the Asian 
collapse.  The slowdown in growth predicted by the 
analysis would have occurred gradually and 
asymptotically, rather than immediately and all at once. 
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It is also ironic, as Stiglitz points out, that the 
international financial institutions who are now 
ascribing the crisis to excessive government intervention 
were not too long ago denying that there was much 
government intervention at all in these economies.  When 
it was successful the model was being interpreted as one 
of a minimalist state in which the government only 
provided the overall framework for private enterprise to 
flourish.  Now that these countries have suffered a 
crisis, it is being conveniently argued that it is due to 
extensive state intervention (World Bank 1991; for a 
critique see Singh 1994, 1998c).    
 
More serious attempts to relate the Asian model to the 
crisis such as that of the IMF (1998) involves the notion 
of over-investment, disregard of profits, and the lack of 
competition in these economies.  It is suggested that 
close government-business relations led to “crony 
capitalism” which in turn led to excessive investment in 
unprofitable or marginal projects.  This analysis may 
explain a weakness of the system which could lead to a 
slowdown in economic growth, but why should it happen so 
suddenly?  Here the critics of the Asian model put 
forward two important arguments.  First, the fact that 
the combination of government-business-finance 
interrelationships generated a highly geared corporate 
sector.  High gearing made the corporate sector 
financially fragile and vulnerable to interest rate 
shocks. Krugman suggests that “crony capitalism” 
contributed to financial fragility through its 
pervasiveness in the critical financial sector.  The 
financial sector was under-regulated, political 
favouritism permitted it to over-invest in areas such as 
property, and was also subject to implicit guarantees 
that the government would bail it out if serious problems 
developed (Krugman, 1998).   
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The other argument is made in terms of transparency.  The 
markets did not have adequate information about the true 
financial status of the corporations and the banks.  Once 
the markets began to assess the true facts, there was a 
collapse of confidence.  As the Managing Director of the 
IMF, Mr. Camdessus, put it: 
 
In Korea, for example, opacity had become 
systemic.  The lack of transparency about 
government, corporate and financial sector 
operations concealed the extent of Korea’s 
problems - so much so that corrective action came 
too late and ultimately could not prevent the 
collapse of market confidence, with the IMF 
finally being authorised to intervene just days 
before potential bankruptcy.
3
 
  
To sum up, the critics of the Asian model can plausibly 
explain both the slowdown and its suddenness by invoking 
the lack of transparency, financial fragility, and an 
inadequately regulated and unsound financial system 
dominated by political cronyism. 
 
 
IV.  The Financial Crisis: Preliminary Analytical and 
Empirical Considerations 
 
The above analysis linking the financial crisis to the 
Asian model may be plausible, but is it analytically and 
empirically correct? 
 
The first important issue is that of the fundamentals.  
Tables 2 and 3 present information on the relevant 
                                                     
3
  Speech to Transparency International, reported in the IMF 
Survey, 9 February 1998. 
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variables for the Asian countries directly affected by 
the crisis as well as for three countries not directly 
affected by the crisis - India, Mexico and Brazil.  
Compared with the latter three countries the Asian 
economies all had by and large strong fundamentals as 
indicated by the following variables: 
 
 high long- and near-term rates of growth 
of GDP 
 low, single digit rates of inflation 
 very high domestic savings and investment 
rates 
 fiscal soundness with low public debt to 
GDP ratios 
 export orientation and high rates of 
growth of exports 
 
However, as Table 2 indicates, the current account 
deficits of the Asian countries tended to be somewhat 
larger than those of India, Mexico and Brazil.  This 
partly reflected the fact that countries like Malaysia 
were major recipients of FDI.  However, in each case the 
deficits were sustainable and had not constrained fast 
economic growth in previous years.  Furthermore, prior to 
the crisis the current accounts of the Asian countries 
had generally been improving.  For example, the Malaysian 
deficit had come down from 10% of GDP in 1995 to 5-6% in 
1996-1997. 
 
To sum up, as Singh (1998d) notes all the affected Asian 
countries had strong “fundamentals” in the sense of a 
proven record of being able to sustain fast economic 
growth. In view of their export orientation, they also 
had the ability to service their debts in the medium- to 
long-term.  They did, however, suffer to varying degrees 
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from short term imbalances such as overvalued exchange 
rates, as well as short term liabilities of the financial 
sector which exceeded the value of central bank reserves. 
This required some macroeconomic adjustments and 
restructuring of debts. In other words, these countries 
had problems of liquidity rather than solvency.  Finally, 
Wolf’s (1998) observations on the country most affected 
by the crisis, Indonesia, are most apt: 
 
Dwell for a moment, on Indonesia: its current 
account deficit was less than 4 percent of GDP 
throughout the 1990’s; its budget was in 
balance; inflation was below 10 percent; at the 
end of 1996 the real exchange rate (as 
estimated by J.P. Morgan) was just 4 percent 
higher than at the end of 1994; and the ratio 
to GDP of domestic bank credit to the private 
sector had risen merely from 50 percent in 1990 
to 55 percent in 1996. True, the banking system 
had mountains of bad debt, but foreign lending 
to Indonesian companies had largely bypassed 
it.  Is anyone prepared to assert that this is 
a country whose exchange rate one might expect 
to depreciate by about 75 percent? Some 
exchange-rate adjustment was certainly 
necessary; what happened beggars belief. (Wolf, 
1998) 
  
The external capital flows to the affected countries 
summarised in Table 4 indicate the proximate cause of the 
financial crisis was a sudden reversal of external 
capital flows.  From 1994 to 1996 net private capital 
inflows to the Asian countries more than doubled (rising 
from $40.5 billion to $90.3 billion).  However, in 1997 
there was a net outflow of $12 billion, a turnaround of 
over $100 billion, which is equivalent to about 10% of 
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the GDP of these countries.  Although portfolio flows 
were fickle (a positive figure of $12 billion in 1996 
turned to a negative figure of $11.6 billion in 1997), 
the main offenders were the commercial banks: their 
lending to the affected countries had risen from $24 
billion in 1994 to $55 billion in 1996.  But in 1997 
there was a net withdrawal of funds by the banks to the 
tune of $21.3 billion. 
 
The overall evidence supports the argument of Radelet and 
Sachs (1998) that this was a classic case of a panic run 
on the bank where each bank considered only the short-
term illiquidity of the countries concerned and 
consequently withdrew its funds, exacerbating the loss of 
confidence and making the crisis worse for both borrowers 
and lenders.  In more technical terms, the two authors 
suggest that in the financial markets there may be 
multiple equilibria and in the absence of co-ordination, 
the economic agents in this particular case ended up in a 
highly suboptimal equilibrium.  Feldstein (1998) 
similarly notes that the IMF insistence that the crisis 
was caused by fundamental flaws intrinsic to these 
economies may have contributed to this bad equilibrium by 
frightening already skittish investors.  Instead of 
opting for multi-billion dollar bailouts with far 
reaching conditionality, both these analyses suggest  
that the most useful policy for the IMF to pursue would 
have been to emphasise the sound fundamentals of these 
countries, their phenomenal success in export markets, 
their strong supply-side capabilities and their ability 
to service in the medium- to long- term their debt 
obligations.  In other words, the IMF should have acted 
as a co-ordinator between borrowers and lenders to help 
match the maturity structure of the debt to the 
countries’ ability to repay it and thus help generate a 
far more optimal equilibrium. 
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V.  Was the Asian model responsible for the crisis?  
 
We turn now to the specific issues raised with respect to 
the aspects of the Asian model which may have contributed 
to the crisis, starting with the suggestion that the 
reason for the market’s overreaction was the lack of 
transparency in the corporate and financial systems of 
the Asian countries.  This issue requires serious 
analysis and several points need to be considered.   
 
First, the banks in Germany have also traditionally been 
less than transparent in the accounts they maintain with 
hidden reserves and often hidden provisions for losses.  
Indeed, many practitioners would regard transparency in 
banking as not being particularly virtuous.  As the new 
President of the European Central Bank, Wim Duisenberg, 
observed in the first speech after his appointment, what 
is required is accountability rather than transparency.   
 
Secondly, it will be appreciated that banking crises are 
endemic to capitalism and can occur with or without 
transparency.  For example, as recently as the early 
1990s the Scandinavian countries, which would be very 
high in any international transparency league, had a 
full-blown banking crisis with serious affects on the 
real economy.   
 
Thirdly, on the subject of the availability of financial 
information, Professor Lamfalussy, the former chief 
economist of the Bank of International Settlements, has 
noted in a letter to the Financial Times:   
 
…the Bank for International Settlement is 
encouraged to speed up the publication of its 
statistics on international bank lending…The 
suggested improvement will surely do no harm 
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but it will not do much good either as long as 
market participants and other concerned parties 
fail to read publicly available information or 
to draw practical conclusions from it. 
 
In the summer of 1996 the BIS reported in its 
half yearly statistics that by end-1995 the 
total of consolidated bank claims on South 
Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia 
reached $201.6bn….It was therefore known by 
mid-summer 1996 that bank claims maturing 
within one year made up 70 per cent of the 
total for South Korea, 69.4 per cent for 
Thailand, 61.9 per cent for Indonesia, but 
“only” 47.2 per cent for Malaysia. 
 
The BIS (1998) report therefore rightly notes that 
information and transparency will not be enough to 
eliminate financial crises, rather “what is also needed 
is the vision to imagine crises and the will to act pre-
emptively.”   
 
Finally, it is not without interest in this connection to 
note that international banks had lent in the case of 
Korea huge sums of money to newly established merchant 
banks all of which did not have a long enough track 
record and many of which were poorly managed (Chang, 
1998).  In normal circumstances, whether or not there is 
transparency, such lending would be regarded as imprudent 
or even reckless; unless, of course, the banks had reason 
to believe that they would be repaid their monies either 
by the government or through a International Monetary 
Fund bailout. 
 
Turning to the question of over-investment and the 
misallocation of resources, it is strange that this is 
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being ascribed to the failings of the Asian model.  For 
in the normal workings of the Asian model, the government 
would have controlled the allocation of investment to 
unfavoured sectors such as real estate.  It would also 
have co-ordinated investment activity so as to maintain 
profits (Singh, 1998b).  It was precisely by abandoning 
the main tenets of the Asian model through financial 
liberalisation that the present imbalances were allowed 
to occur. 
 
Financial liberalisation was also a major factor in 
making the traditional corporate sector in Asian 
countries fragile.  As Table 5 shows, South Korea’s 
corporate sector was the most highly geared of the nine 
emerging markets in the sample (as measured by 
debt/equity ratios).  After South Korea, the Indian 
corporate sector is the second most highly geared - with 
a higher debt/equity ratio than either Malaysia or 
Thailand.  India, however, did not have a financial 
crisis (for reasons which are discussed later). 
 
Before financial liberalisation in Korea, the high 
debt/equity ratios were not a significant problem.  Such 
high debt/equity ratios arose from the fact that the 
Korean chaebol expanded at a very fast rate with the help 
of loans provided by state-controlled banks.  This 
enabled families with a small equity base to both own and 
control very large corporations.  These chaebol were 
themselves the creation of the government and were used 
as a vehicle for the government’s drive for rapid 
industrialisation and technological catch-up.  In view of 
the nature of the risks involved in vast investments in 
new products and processes in a developing country,  left 
to themselves the private corporations would not have 
been willing to undertake such risky activities.  But 
with government encouragement and its willingness to 
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share the risks involved with the enterprise, and in view 
of the fierce competition with the other chaebol, they 
were willing to undertake such risks.  Technological 
risks were thus socialised and the resulting system 
produced a very fast industrialisation of the country 
that enabled Korea to capture world markets in an ever 
increasing range of more and more sophisticated products.   
 
As Lee (1992) has argued, what the government in effect 
was doing was operating an internal capital market.  Such 
a market, as Williamson (1975) pointed out in his seminal 
analysis of the internal allocation of capital by 
conglomerates, may in many circumstances be more 
efficient than an external capital market.  The latter is 
often subject to speculation, asymmetric information and 
myriad other market inefficiencies.  Stock market prices 
which emerge may not be efficient in Tobin’s fundamental 
valuation sense (i.e. they may be subject to speculative 
influences, whims and fashions).   
 
However, financial liberalisation fundamentally changed 
this whole system.  High debt/equity ratios without the 
government’s active involvement in risk taking made the 
corporate system fragile.  Furthermore, it was 
accentuated by the fact that not only  was the overt 
government control over corporate borrowings 
(particularly abroad) and investment abandoned, but it 
was not even replaced by adequate prudential regulation. 
 
That precipitate financial liberalisation rather than the 
Asian model has been the main factor in the financial 
crisis of the affected countries is also indicated by the 
experience of India and China.  The Indian fundamentals, 
as Table 3 suggests, are considerably worse than those in 
the Asian countries struck by the crisis.  Yet India was 
able to maintain relative currency stability as well as 
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avoid stock market panics despite the fact that the 
country in the recent period has been subject to 
considerable policy uncertainty because of unstable 
governments.  The main reason is that although it has 
introduced some capital account liberalisation, it 
maintains extensive and comprehensive controls, 
particularly over borrowings abroad by individuals, 
corporations or banks (Singh 1998a).   
 
Similarly, China has been able to avoid financial crisis 
by maintaining extensive controls on capital movements.  
This is particularly notable in view of the fact that in 
the most recent period, China has suffered reduced 
economic growth and considerable slowing down of the rate 
of growth of its exports.  It is also interesting that 
despite capital controls, the country, during the last 
decade, has been the largest recipient of FDI inflows in 
the developing world. 
 
 
VI.   Conclusion and Policy Implications. 
 
This paper has argued that the influential thesis of the 
US government and the IMF that the fundamental causes of 
the Asian financial crisis lie in the dirigiste model of 
guided capitalism followed by these countries is 
seriously mistaken.  The crisis has arisen in large 
measure by precipitate financial liberalisation which 
involved the abandonment of the essential tenets of the 
model. 
 
Unfortunately in the case of the IMF, the mistaken 
diagnosis has inevitably lead to wrong policy 
prescriptions which have exacerbated rather than 
alleviated the crisis.  Apart from ascribing the crisis 
“fundamentally” to the Asian model, at the beginning of 
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the crisis the Fund also evidently interpreted it as a 
traditional balance of payments crisis brought about by 
government fiscal excesses.  Its policy prescriptions 
therefore involved the usual remedies of fiscal and 
monetary contraction and high interest rates.  To cope 
with the fundamental structural causes of the crisis 
(i.e. the dirigiste model), the Fund recommended further 
financial liberalisation together with far reaching 
changes in basic social institutions. 
 
The consequences of this misdiagnosis and of the policies 
which followed from it have been catastrophic. The Fund 
had originally estimated that as a result of its bailouts 
and conditionalities, GDP in affected countries would 
contract, but only by relatively small amounts.  It 
failed fully to appreciate that the Asian crisis was not 
of the traditional type, but that it was a crisis caused 
by private rather than public profligacy, and that it was 
a crisis of the capital account rather than the current 
account.
4
  In these circumstances, the Fund’s policy of 
high interest rates and fiscal austerity have managed to 
effectively bankrupt the corporate and banking sectors 
and thereby generate a deep depression in the stricken 
economies.  Far from the small contraction the IMF 
foresaw,  Goldman Sachs now forecasts that in 1998 real 
GDP will contract by 15% in Indonesia, 8% in Thailand, 
and 7% in Korea. 
 
To restore economic health to Asian economies would 
require a radical change in the IMF’s analyses and policy 
prescriptions.  At the level of political economy, one 
                                                     
4
  Some may argue that even if the IMF had analysed the problem 
correctly they would have still applied the traditional 
medicine, but in that case they would at least have had to 
present a different justification.  This could have taken the 
form that the austerity policies are demanded by the market in 
order to restore confidence. 
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important policy implication of this paper is that the 
deep crisis makes it all the more necessary for the 
affected countries to not only maintain the close 
government-business relationships of the Asian model, but 
indeed to extend them to involve trade unions and groups 
in civil society.  The resolution of the crisis requires 
credible policies which must necessarily be based on co-
operation and equitable sharing of the burden of 
adjustment. 
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